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INTRODUCTION 
The American criminal justice system is often envisioned as one in 
which public prosecutors pursue public prosecutions on behalf of the pub-
lic—leaving no room for crime victims‘ involvement.  However, state and 
federal statutes and state constitutional amendments have challenged this 
vision.  Perhaps the best example of such a challenge comes from the Crime 
Victims‘ Rights Act (―CVRA‖), a federal statute passed by Congress in 
2004 that guarantees victims a series of rights in federal criminal proceed-
ings.1 
Although the CVRA has received broad bipartisan support,2 it also has 
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1
  See Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Vic-
tims‘ Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, tit. I, 118 Stat. 2260, 2261–65 (2004) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 3771 (2006) and to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10603(d)–(e)) (link).  This Essay refers to the 
act simply as the Crime Victims‘ Rights Act, or CVRA.  Specifically, the CVRA gives crime victims the 
following eight enumerated rights: 
 
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused; (2) The right to reason-
able, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding, or any parole 
proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused; (3) 
The right not to be excluded from any public court proceeding, unless the court, 
after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the 
victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that pro-
ceeding; (4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the dis-
trict court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding; (5) The 
reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case; (6) 
The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law; (7) The right to pro-
ceedings free from unreasonable delay; and (8) The right to be treated with fair-
ness and with respect for the victim‘s dignity and privacy. 
 
Id. § 3771(a)(1)(8). 
2
  See Danielle Levine, Public Wrongs and Private Rights: Limiting the Victim’s Role in a System of 
Public Prosecution, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 335, 361 (2010) (noting that ―the victims‘ rights movement has 
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vine‘s thoughtful piece, published in the Northwestern University Law Re-
view, entitled ―Public Wrongs and Private Rights: Limiting the Victim‘s 
Role in a System of Public Prosecution.‖3  In her article, Levine advances 
both a procedural and substantive challenge to the rights granted to crime 
victims by the CVRA.4  First, in her procedural challenge—a position that a 
minority of federal circuit courts have adopted—Levine argues that victims 
should be able to challenge denials of their rights by district courts only in 
the rare circumstance of a ―clear and indisputable‖ error.5  From a substan-
tive perspective, Levine contends that giving victims ordinary appellate re-
view when their rights are denied would interfere with the discretion that 
American prosecutors regularly exercise in criminal cases, and could even 
―threaten the fair and just adjudication of a criminal case.‖6 
These arguments are typical of attacks on the CVRA.  In this brief re-
joinder, we respond to both of Levine‘s claims—a response that we hope 
will illustrate more generally how attacks on crime victims‘ rights are mis-
guided.  Part I begins by providing a quick review of the CVRA and the 
charges advanced by its critics.  Part II then turns to the question of the ap-
propriate standard of review for crime victims‘ appeals brought under the 
CVRA.  In contrast to the position staked out by its critics, including Le-
vine, crime victims should receive ordinary appellate review, because such 
review is both consistent with Congressional intent and, more importantly, 
such review is dictated by common sense.  Finally, Part III addresses the 
substantive argument that rights granted to crime victims may somehow in-
terfere with the administration of justice.  Part IV concludes that victims‘ 
rights do not impair the just adjudication of criminal cases, but rather im-
prove it. 
I. THE CVRA AND ITS CRITICS 
The history of the crime victims‘ rights movement has been chronicled 
at length elsewhere.7  For present purposes, it is enough to note that victims‘ 
rights advocates made considerable progress in the late 1980‘s and early 
1990‘s by passing state constitutional amendments and statutes extending 
                                                                                                                           
tremendous political support . . . [and] is appealing to both conservatives who want to be tough on crime 
and liberals who want to give a voice to those in need of an advocate.‖) (link). 
3
  See id. 
4
  See id. 
5
  Id. at 351. 
6
  Id. at 361. 
7
  See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL, & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 5–17 (3d ed. 2010); Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure: Proposed Amendments in Light of the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 2005 BYU L. REV. 835, 
841–50; Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 861, 865–70 (link); Steven J. Joffee, Validating Victims: En-
forcing Victims’ Rights Through Mandatory Mandamus, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 241, 242–45 (link). 
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rights to crime victims in the criminal process.8  These victims‘ rights have 
included the right to attend court hearings and to be heard regarding plea 
bargains and sentences.9 
Building on this progress, in 1995, victims‘ advocates made an effort 
to enact a federal constitutional amendment designed to place victims‘ 
rights on a firm foundation.10  To bring this goal to fruition, the advocacy 
movement—lead most prominently by the National Victims Constitutional 
Amendment Network—approached the President and Congress with a pro-
posed amendment.11  As a result of these discussions, on April 22, 1996, 
Senators Jon Kyl, Orrin Hatch, and Dianne Feinstein, with the backing of 
President Bill Clinton, introduced a federal victims‘ rights amendment.12  
The intent of this amendment was to ―restore, preserve, and protect, as a 
matter of right for the victims of violent crimes, the practice of victim par-
ticipation in the administration of criminal justice that was the birthright of 
every American at the founding of our Nation.‖13  The amendment would 
have extended a series of rights to crime victims, including: 
 
the right to reasonable and timely notice of any public pro-
ceeding involving the crime and of any release or escape of 
the accused; the rights not to be excluded from such public 
proceeding and reasonably to be heard at public release, 
plea, sentencing, reprieve, and pardon proceedings; and the 
right to adjudicative decisions that duly consider the vic-
tim‘s safety, interest in avoiding unreasonable delay, and 
just and timely claims to restitution from the offender.14 
 
Although the proposed amendment received significant backing in 
Congress, it never succeeded in attracting the required two-thirds support.15  
As a result, in 2004, the victims‘ rights movement instead pressed for a far-





  See Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM L. 611, 614–15 
(2009) (link). 
9
  See id. 
10
  See id. at 615. 
11
  Id.  See generally Steven J. Twist, The Crime Victims’ Rights Amendment and Two Good and 
Perfect Things, 1999 UTAH. L. REV. 369 (advocating for the crime victims‘ amendment).  For more in-
formation about the federal constitutional victims‘ rights amendment, see National Victims‘ Constitu-
tional Amendment Passage, www.nvcan.org (link). 
12
  See S.J. Res. 104-52, 104th Cong. (Apr. 22, 1996) (link). 
13
  S. REP. NO. 108-191, at 12 (2003); see S. REP. NO. 106-254, at 12 (2000). 
14
  S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. (Jan. 7, 2003). 
15
  See Cassell, supra note 8, at 615. 
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criminal justice system.16  In exchange for setting aside the federal amend-
ment in the short term, victims‘ advocates received near-universal congres-
sional support for a ―broad and encompassing‖ statutory victims‘ bill of 
rights.17  This ―new and bolder‖ approach—known as the Crime Victims‘ 
Rights Act—not only created a baseline of victims‘ rights, but also pro-
vided funding for victims‘ legal services and created remedies for violations 
of victims‘ rights.18 
It is important to understand two key features of this legislation.  First, 
the CVRA includes a guaranteed right for all victims in federal cases to be 
―reasonably heard‖ regarding plea bargains and sentences.19  Second, unlike 
earlier legislation,20 the CVRA contains an explicit enforcement mechanism 
that entitles victims who believe their rights have been violated by a trial 
court to seek mandamus review in the appellate courts.21 
In the five years since the CVRA‘s passage, its critics have contended 
that it has the potential to unduly expand the rights of crime victims in 
criminal proceedings.22  In such critics‘ views, the CVRA threatens both 
prosecutorial and judicial independence.23  Specifically, Levine describes a 
series of ―worrisome repercussions related to the proliferation of victims‘ 
rights,‖ which she believes can be avoided only if the CVRA‘s mandamus 
provision is narrowly construed.24  Thus, relying on traditional mandamus 
standards from other contexts, Levine urges that the CVRA‘s enforcement 
provision allow victims to obtain redress only for ―flagrant abuses of the 
law.‖25  In support of this position, Levine contends that this standard ―re-
spects the prosecutorial and judicial discretion,‖ which Congress ―explicitly 
built into the statute.‖26  According to Levine, adopting this standard will al-
low prosecutors and judges ―to maintain their independence and discretion‖ 
and keep our system of public, rather than private, prosecutions.27  Others 





  Jon Kyl et al., On the Wings of their Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Pres-
ton, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims‘ Rights Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 581, 583 
(2005). 
17
  150 CONG. REC. S4261 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
18
  Id. at S4262. 
19
  18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5) (2006) (link). 
20
  See Joffee, supra note 7, at 244 (citing the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, the Victims‘ Rights and 
Restitution Act of 1990, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, and the Victims 
Rights Clarification Act of 1997). 
21
  18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (2006) (link). 
22
  See, e.g., Erin C. Blondel, Note, Victims’ Rights in an Adversary System, 58 DUKE L.J. 237, 271 
(2008). 
23
  See, e.g., Levine, supra note 2, at 361. 
24
  Id. 
25
  Id. 
26
  Id. at 336. 
27
  Id. at 361. 
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victims very little power‖ because ―perhaps Congress simply was unwilling 
to abandon the existing public prosecution model.‖28 
II. RESTRICTING THE CVRA‘S APPELLATE REVIEW PROVISION TO 
FLAGRANT ABUSES OF THE LAW IS CONTRARY TO THE LETTER OF THE 
CVRA 
Levine‘s position that appellate courts should have discretion when re-
viewing victims‘ claims contravenes the plain language of the CVRA.  Spe-
cifically, the CVRA‘s enforcement provision provides that whenever a 
victim is denied any of her enumerated rights, the victim ―may petition the 
court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. . . . [which] [t]he court . . . shall 
take up and decide . . . forthwith . . . .‖29  Under Levine‘s approach, howev-
er, an appellate court would not be required to ―take up and decide‖ a vic-
tim‘s petition for relief.  Instead, an appellate court could find a violation 
but nonetheless decide not to remedy the wrong that occurred in the district 
court.30  In doing so, an appellate court would have to disregard the underly-
ing purpose of the CVRA‘s appellate review provision.31  For example, one 
of the leading authorities on crime victims‘ rights has recognized in discuss-
ing the CVRA‘s mandamus provision that: 
 
[T]he problem in review of victims‘ rights is not the un-
availability of writ review, but rather the discretionary na-
ture of writs. The solution to the review problem is to 
provide for nondiscretionary review of victims‘ rights vi-
olations. . . . One could not credibly suggest that criminal 
defendants‘ constitutional rights are to be reviewed only in 
the discretion of the court. . . . The solution of Congress in 
[the CVRA] is excellent, providing for a nondiscretionary 
writ of mandamus.32 
 
Levine, however, argues that such discretionary review is appropriate.  
Citing a rule of statutory construction involving ―borrow[ed] terms of art,‖ 





  Blondel, supra note 22, at 260. 
29
  18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (2006) (emphasis added). 
30
  For a concrete illustration, see In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008) (despite the strength of 
the victims‘ claim, the district court did not grant the victims of the explosion any relief). 
31
  See Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Re-
view, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255, 34748 (link). 
32
  Id. 
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CVRA, it also intended to import discretionary mandamus principles.33  
This reasoning is flawed.34 
In the CVRA, Congress expressly altered the conventional discretion 
that would otherwise apply to the review of ordinary mandamus petitions 
by requiring appellate courts to ―take up and decide‖ CVRA petitions.35  
Through this modification of the traditional mandamus standard, Congress 
sought to create a powerful new remedy that would fully protect crime vic-
tims and allow them to obtain expedited review of trial court actions before 
events in the trial court progressed beyond the point of remedy.36  Given this 
desire for quick action, Congress chose the vehicle of a ―writ of mandamus‖ 
for crime victims‘ review of trial court actions.37  However, rather than in-
tending to require victims to comply with ordinary mandamus standards, 
Congress sought to forge that tool into a powerful new remedy that would 
fully protect crime victims through its inclusion of the ―shall take up and 
decide‖ language.38 
Both the Second and Ninth Circuits have recognized this straightfor-
ward conclusion.39  In In re W.R. Huff Management Co., the Second Circuit 
specifically recognized that ―a petition seeking relief pursuant to the man-
damus provision set forth in [the CVRA] need not overcome the hurdles 
typically faced by a petitioner seeking review of a district court determina-
tion through a writ of mandamus.‖40  Likewise, in Kenna v. United States 
District Court, the Ninth Circuit held that: 
 
[T]he CVRA contemplates active review of orders denying 
victims‘ rights claims even in routine cases.  The CVRA 
explicitly gives victims aggrieved by a district court‘s order 
the right to petition for review by writ of mandamus, pro-
vides for expedited review of such a petition, allows a sin-
gle judge to make a decision thereon, and requires a 
reasoned decision in case the writ is denied.  The CVRA 





  See Levine, supra note 2, at 351 (citing In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1124 (10th Cir. 2008)). 
34
  For a discussion of the inapplicability of the ―borrowed terms of art‖ rule of statutory construct to 
the CVRA‘s mandamus provision, see Joffee, supra note 7, at 251–54. 
35
  See 150 CONG. REC. S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).  Because Sen-
ator Feinstein was the co-sponsor of the CVRA and no contrary views were offered, her views are en-
titled to considerable weight in interpreting the statute.  See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for C.D. Cal., 435 
F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2006) (relying heavily on Sen. Feinstein‘s floor statements as a sponsor of the 
CVRA) (link). 
36
  See 150 CONG. REC. S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
37
  See id. 
38
  See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (2006). 
39
  See Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1017; In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 562–63 (2d Cir. 
2005) (link). 
40
  409 F.3d at 562. 
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tine interlocutory review of district court decisions denying 
rights asserted under the statute.41 
 
The CVRA further reinforces these conclusions by broadly command-
ing that crime victims must ―be treated with fairness‖ throughout the crimi-
nal justice process.42  Moreover, the CVRA directs that ―[i]n any court 
proceeding‖—presumably including appellate proceedings—―the court 
shall ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described in [the 
CVRA].‖43  This Congressional command—that appellate courts ensure that 
crime victims are afforded their rights—would be fatally compromised if 
courts were permitted to deny or withhold relief as a matter of discretion or 
deference. 
Levine notes these arguments, but dismisses them for two reasons.  
First, she contends that allowing victims to pursue mandamus relief would 
―essentially give[] victims the same rights as the defendant or the prosecu-
tion.‖44  Apparently, Levine views this as an undesirable result.  But to 
many others, this will be a long overdue correction to a system that ―has 
lost an essential balance . . . [by] depriv[ing] the innocent, the honest, and 
the helpless of its protection . . . .‖45  Indeed, it is noteworthy that the 
CVRA‘s legislative history indicates that Congress wanted to ―balance the 
scales of justice‖46 because it recognized that ―criminal defendants ha[d] an 
array of rights under the law, [and] that crime victims ha[d] few meaningful 
rights.‖47  Other commentators have reached similar conclusions.48 
Regardless of Congress‘s desire to ―balance the scales of justice,‖ 
however, Levine‘s claim that the CVRA places victims on completely equal 
footing with prosecutors or defendants is simply incorrect.  Rather, the 
CVRA only allows victims to obtain appellate review of violations of their 
rights guaranteed by the Act.  In fact, the Act‘s enforcement provision spe-





  435 F.3d at 1017. 
42
  18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8) (2006). 
43
  18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(1). 
44
  Levine, supra note 2, at 359. 
45
  Kyl et al., supra note 16, at 584 (quoting PRESIDENT‘S TASK FORCE ON VICTIM OF CRIME: FINAL 
REPORT (1982)). 
46
  See 150 CONG. REC. S4265 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl); see also 150 CONG. 
REC. S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (―[T]he scales of justice are out of 
balance . . . .‖); 150 CONG. REC. S4270 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (―Victims‘ 
rights are about a fair and balanced criminal justice systemone that considers defendant‘s rights as 
well as victims‘ rights.‖). 
47
  150 CONG. REC. S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
48
  See, e.g., Elijah Lawrence, Note, Victim Opinion Statements: Providing Justice for Grieving 
Families, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 511 (2010) (link). 
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rights are violated.49  Thus, in contrast to a prosecutor, a victim who is 
simply dissatisfied with the length of a prison sentence given to a defendant 
would not be able to seek mandamus review.50 
Levine‘s second objection to giving victims ordinary appellate review 
is that it would allow an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of 
the district court on sentencing issues.51  Levine argues that this result 
would contradict the Supreme Court‘s recent pronouncement in Gall v. 
United States that district court sentencing judgments should be presumed 
to be reasonable.52  However, this objection is also wide of the mark.  First, 
the holding in Gall relates only to appeals of sentencing issues.53  Thus, 
Gall provides no basis for restricting crime victim appeals of other issues, 
such as violations of victims‘ rights at bail hearings or during the plea bar-
gaining process.  Second, even with regard to sentencing issues, Levine‘s 
objection assumes that a victim could appeal a judge‘s discretionary deci-
sion to sentence a defendant to a particular term of imprisonment.  But as 
previously explained, under the CVRA, a victim is only able to appeal a vi-
olation of her statutory rights, rather than appeal a mere disagreement with 
the judge‘s sentencing philosophy. 
A good illustration of the problems associated with an approach bar-
ring all victim appellate challenges is found in the Fifth Circuit‘s decision 
of In re Dean.54  In Dean, the defendant—the American subsidiary of the 
well-known petroleum company BP—and the prosecution arranged a secret 
plea bargain to resolve the company‘s criminal liability for violations of en-
vironmental laws.55  These violations resulted in the release of dangerous 
gas into the environment, leading to a catastrophic explosion in Texas City, 
Texas, that killed fifteen workers and injured scores more.56  Because the 
Government did not notify or confer with the victims before reaching the 





  18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (2006).  The enumerated rights in the statute are primarily those found in 
18 U.S.C. § 3771(a), namely the right to reasonable protection from the accused; to notice of court hear-
ings; to not be excluded from public hearings; to be reasonably heard on bail for defendants, pleas, and 
sentencing; to confer with the prosecutor; to restitution; to be free from unreasonable delay; and to be 
treated with fairness.  18 U.S.C. § 3771(a). 
50
  A victim is, however, entitled to appeal a restitution decision by a judge, as an erroneous restitu-
tion decision deprives a victim of ―[t]he right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.‖ 18 
U.S.C. §3771(a)(6). 
51
  See Levine, supra note 2, at 34849. 
52
  552 U.S. 38, 40 (2007). 
53
  See id. at 41 (―We now hold that, while the extent of the difference between a particular sentence 
and the recommended Guidelines range is surely relevant, courts of appeals must review all sen-
tenceswhether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines rangeunder a deferential 
abuse-of-discretion standard.‖). 
54
  527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008) (link).  In the interests of full disclosure, one of the present authors 
(Cassell) served as pro bono legal counsel for the victims in the Dean criminal case. 
55
  See United States v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12893, **3–18 (S.D. Tex. 
Feb. 21, 2008). 
56
  See In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 392. 
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teed right under the CVRA to ―to confer with the attorney for the Govern-
ment.‖57 
Unfortunately, despite the strength of the victims‘ claim, the district 
court did not grant the victims of the explosion any relief, leading them to 
file a CVRA mandamus petition with the Fifth Circuit.58  After reviewing 
the record, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the crime victims that the district 
court had ―misapplied the law and failed to accord the victims their rights 
conferred by the CVRA . . . .‖59  Nonetheless, the court declined to award 
the victims any relief because it viewed the CVRA‘s mandamus petition as 
providing only discretionary relief.60 
Levine applauds this result, noting that ―[t]he Fifth Circuit‘s dicta re-
veal that if it had used an abuse of discretion standard, the court likely 
would have reached the opposite result on the merits.‖61  The Fifth Circuit 
was able to escape this result by using the ―clear and indisputable error‖ 
standard, which virtually licensed the district court judge to abuse her dis-
cretion.  Still, even after suggesting that the trial court judge had abused her 
discretion,62 Levine supports this result by contending that a reversal would 
have led to a potential violation of prosecutorial ethics.63  Specifically, Le-
vine claims that the prosecutor would have been required to notify the vic-
tims of a proposed plea bargain, thereby leading to potentially prejudicial 
pre-trial publicity.64 
What Levine fails to note, however, is that prejudice to plea negotia-
tions could only justify violating the CVRA if the Constitution forced this 
stark result.  This is because, as an Act of Congress, the CVRA was binding 
on the prosecution and the district court unless it was deemed positively un-
constitutional.65  However, the simple fact is that ―there is no constitutional 
right to plea bargain.‖66  Moreover, BP did not have to engage in plea dis-





  Id. at 394. 
58
  See id. at 392. 
59
  Id. at 394. 
60
  Id. at 396. 
61
  Levine, supra note 2, at 356. 
62
  In Dean, the victims argued to the district court that they had been denied (among other things) 
their CVRA right to confer with the prosecutor because of an ex parte procedure used during the plea 
bargaining process.  See, e.g., Victims‘ Reply to Government‘s Response to Victims‘ Motion Filed Pur-
suant to the Crime Victims‘ Rights Act, United States v. BP Products North America Inc., Crim. No. H-
07-434 (S.D. Tex. 2008), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12893.  Levine never directly discusses whether or not 
the victims were correct in their argument.  She does note, however, that if the Fifth Circuit had a less 
deferential standard of review, it would have likely found that the trial judge had abused her discretion.  
Id. at 360. 
63
  See id. at 356. 
64
  Id. 
65
  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (―[T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land . . . .‖) (link). 
66
  Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977) (link). 
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harmful to its interests.  BP could not demand a right to plea bargain in se-
cret in violation of the CVRA.  The same conclusion applies viewing the 
facts from the prosecution‘s perspective.  If the prosecution truly faced the 
choice between protecting the congressionally-guaranteed rights of crime 
victims and reaching a deal with a criminal, the CVRA requires it to side 
with victims. 
Because there is no constitutionally protected right to plea bargain, it 
was entirely unnecessary to withhold from the victims the fact that plea ne-
gotiations were occurring.  The Government could have first asked BP 
whether it wanted to move forward with plea discussions, even though the 
victims would then have been told about them.  The choice that BP would 
then have faced would have been no different than that of many other crim-
inals—go to trial on the charges filed by the Government or engage in po-
tentially advantageous plea discussions.  Moreover, if the matter ultimately 
proceeded to trial, the court could address any concern about prejudicial 
publicity through voir dire.  Though publicity resulting from acknowledg-
ment of plea discussions might have required more extensive voir dire, this 
slight complication cannot justify the prosecution‘s decision to dispense en-
tirely with the victims‘ rights, particularly when the Supreme Court has 
cautioned that ―pretrial publicity—even pervasive, adverse publicity―does 
not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.‖67 
Even assuming arguendo that secrecy about the negotiations was 
somehow constitutionally required, the prosecution still had alternative op-
tions that would have given effect to the victims‘ rights while satisfying 
privacy concerns.  These potential options included: (1) meeting with the 
attorneys that represented the victims in the civil suits against BP under any 
appropriate protective order the court might have required; (2) appointing a 
guardian ad litem to represent the victims under a protective order; and (3) 
meeting with the victims and discussing what plea offer the Government 
might itself extend without commenting on BP‘s preferences.  These ob-
vious alternatives would have fully protected any purported ―right‖ of BP to 
plea bargain, while simultaneously protecting the victims‘ actual and enu-
merated rights under the CVRA. 
Viewed in this light, the Fifth Circuit‘s decision in Dean—along with 
Levine‘s endorsement of it—provides a good case study of what happens to 
victims when CVRA rights are not respected.  In In re Dean, the victims 
were deprived of any meaningful opportunity to confer with the prosecutor 
at a time when it might have made a difference.68  As a result, the victims 
were able to raise their concerns only after a binding plea agreement had al-
ready been reached between the prosecution and the defense.69  The victims‘ 





  Neb. Press Ass‘n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976) (link). 
68
  See 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008) (link). 
69
  See id. 
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that the defendant would fix the insufficient safety measures that were in 
place at the time of the explosion, which led to the death and injuries of the 
workers at the plant.70  However, despite these concerns, the district judge 
simply accepted the plea that the prosecution and the defense had nego-
tiated, concluding that she would not add additional safety protections for 
workers and the public into the agreement.71 
What the plea agreement might have looked like if the victims had 
been able to confer with the prosecutor in a timely fashion will never be 
known for certain.  What is known for certain now, with the benefit of 
hindsight, however, is that the victims‘ concerns were well-founded.  In 
2009, following a six-month investigation, the United States Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (―OSHA‖) announced that BP had failed 
to abate the hazards that were part of the plea agreement it had entered in-
to.72  Furthermore, OSHA found that BP had also committed an additional 
439 ―willful violations of industry standards for safety management 
processes‖ since the plea agreement was reached.73  As a result of these 
findings, OSHA issued an $87.4 million fine against BP,74 and the govern-
ment made unsuccessful efforts to revoke BP‘s probation and reinstate 
charges against the company.75  And, in addition to these violations, BP of 
course has had (to put it mildly) additional environmental and safety prob-
lems in its off-shore drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico76—problems 
that might have been addressed if the Texas City victims‘ proposals had 





  See Victims‘ Joint Mem in Opp‘n to Plea Agreement at 25–30, United States v. BP Prods. N. 
Am., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 655 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 4:07-CR-434) [hereinafter Victims‘ Plea Opposi-
tion] (link). 
71
  See BP Prods., 610 F. Supp. 2d at 720–22. 
72
  See, e.g., Associated Press, BP Fined Record $87 Million for Refinery Blast, MSNBC (Oct. 30, 
2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33549487 (link); OSHA Levies a Record Fine Against Oil Giant 
BP, OMB WATCH (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/10551 (link). 
73
  See OSHA Levies a Record Fine, supra note 72. 
74
  Id. 
75
  See BP TEXAS CITY PLANT EXPLOSION TRIAL, http://www.texascityexplosion.com/ (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2010) (describing, in the ―What‘s New‖ scroll column, the Department of Justice‘s refusal to 
revoke BP‘s probation) (link).  For more information regarding the explosion and subsequent litigation, 
see id. 
76
  See, e.g., Opening Statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Com-
merce, Inquiry into the Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast Oil Spill, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investiga-
tions 2 (2010) (noting that the BP ―catastrophe appears to have been caused by a calamitous series of 
equipment and operational failures‖ and that if BP ―had been more careful, 11 lives might have been 
saved and our coastline protected.‖) (link); see also Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Strategy and 
Implications of the Deepwater Horizon Rig Explosion: Parts 1 and 2: Oversight Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Natural Resources, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 26–27, 2010) (link). 
77
  This ―what if‖ hypothetical is, to be sure, a hypothetical.  But the victims in the BP case specifi-
cally asked the district court to reject the plea because it failed to include a court order requiring ―BP to 
create and implement [an ―Effective Ethics and Compliance‖] program as respects its [Process Safety 
Management (PSM)] obligations under Federal law, and that the Court appoint an independent engineer-
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have been addressed earlier seem to have culminated in the spring and 
summer of 2010 in the environmental and safety catastrophes that stemmed 
from BP‘s drilling operations off the coast of Louisiana.78 
Through the CVRA, Congress intended to ensure that victims would 
receive several important rights, including the right to confer with the gov-
ernment prosecutor.  Yet as Dean demonstrates, Levine‘s position would 
obliterate these rights by permitting district court judges to arbitrarily deny 
them without concern of reversal.  Such a result is dangerous and contrary 
to the language of the CVRA. 
III. THE CVRA‘S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SHOWS CONGRESS PLAINLY 
INTENDED FOR CRIME VICTIMS TO HAVE FULL APPELLATE REVIEW 
As just discussed, the plain language of the CVRA demonstrates that 
Congress wanted crime victims to have ordinary appellate review whenever 
a trial court denies their rights.  The CVRA‘s legislative history further 
supports this conclusion.  However, Levine completely ignores this history 
and endorses the stringent mandamus standard of appellate review of vic-
tims‘ appeals.  Remarkably, Levine hardly stands alone: three Courts of 
Appeals—the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits—have adopted similar ap-
proaches to the standard of review, limiting crime victims to appellate relief 
only for extraordinary error by the district court.79 
The CVRA‘s legislative history leaves no doubt that, contrary to this 
position, Congress clearly intended for victims to have ordinary appellate 
review.  For instance, Senator Jon Kyl, one of the CVRA‘s co-sponsors, 
specifically explained that:  
 
                                                                                                                           
ing expert, or experts, according to the need, knowledgeable in refinery operations and PSM require-
ments, to work under the direction of the Probation Office as a Monitor of the implementation of the 
program.‖  Victims’ Plea Opposition, supra note 70, at 36.  The district court ultimately rejected the vic-
tims‘ argument, essentially finding that BP could be relied upon to do its own safety compliance pro-
gram, as monitored by Government agencies.  See United States v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 610 
F.Supp.2d 655, 722 (S.D. Tex. 2009).  Had the district court instead followed the recommendation of the 
victims, knowledgeable and independent safety experts would have been working inside BP trying to 
change what government investigators had identified as a widespread, long ingrained culture of lack of 
focus on process safety.  U.S. CHEM. SAFETY & HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD., INVESTIGATION REPORT: 
REFINERY EXPLOSION AND FIRE 142–95 (2007), available at 
http://www.csb.gov/assets/document/CSBFinalReportBP.pdf (link).  Whether this would have changed 
the culture at the refinery—and within other sectors of BP—remains a matter of conjecture.  But surely 
from a public policy perspective such endeavors must be regarded as a significant positive, not negative, 
development. 
78
  See Jad Mouawad, For BP, a History of Spills and Safety Lapses, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/business/09bp.html (―Despite those repeated promises to reform, 
BP continues to lag [sic] other oil companies when it comes to safety, according to federal officials and 
industry analysts.‖) (link). 
79
  See In re Acker, 596 F.3d 370, 372 (6th Cir. 2010) (link); In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 
2008); In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1124 (10th Cir. 2008) (link). 
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[W]hile mandamus is generally discretionary, [the CVRA 
mandamus] provision means that courts must review these 
cases.  Appellate review of denials of victims‘ rights is just 
as important as the initial assertion of a victim‘s right.  This 
provision ensures review and encourages courts to broadly 
defend the victims‘ rights. 
 
Without the right to seek appellate review and a guarantee 
that the appellate court will hear the appeal and order relief, 
a victim is left to the mercy of the very trial court that may 
have erred.  This country‘s appellate courts are designed to 
remedy errors of lower courts and this provision requires 
them to do so for victim’s [sic] rights.80 
 
Similarly, the CVRA’s sponsors have instructed that this appellate re-
view provision “provides that [the appellate] court shall take the writ and 
shall order the relief necessary to protect the crime victim’s right,”81 and 
that crime victims must “be able to have denials of those rights reviewed at 
the appellate level, and to have the appellate court take the appeal and or-
der relief.”82 
Moreover, in sharp contradiction to Levine‘s conclusion that the 
CVRA simply imports a ―common law tradition,‖83 Senator Feinstein, the 
Act‘s other co-sponsor, specifically noted that the CVRA would create ―a 
new use of a very old procedure, the writ of mandamus [by] . . .  estab-
lish[ing] a procedure where a crime victim can, in essence, immediately ap-
peal a denial of [her] rights.‖84  Additionally, Senator Feinstein emphasized 
that the CVRA‘s ―mandamus procedure allows an appellate court to take 
timely action to ensure that the trial court follows the rule of law set out in 
this statute.‖85 
Given this legislative history, Levine‘s position fails to give effect to 
Congress‘s design.  Surely, Congress did not intend for appellate courts to 
be able to rein in only flagrant violations of the CVRA.  Instead, Congress 
wanted all victims to receive their rights all of the time.  Based on this goal, 
Congress tried to avoid situations like that in Dean, where the Fifth Circuit 
specifically recognized that victims‘ rights had been violated, but still chose 
to deny the victims any relief.86  The Dean approach defies the basic archi-





  150 CONG. REC. S10912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphases added). 
81
  150 CONG. REC. S4270 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
82
  Id. (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
83
  See Levine, supra note 2, at 349–51. 
84
  150 CONG. REC. S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
85
  Id. 
86
  See In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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sponsors, who stated that, ―without the ability to enforce [victims‘] rights in 
the criminal trial and appellate courts of this country any rights afforded 
are, at best, rhetoric.‖87 
IV. SOUND PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS GIVING VICTIMS FULL RIGHTS 
IN THE PROCESS 
Congress intended the CVRA to give crime victims participatory rights 
in the criminal justice process.  We also understand Levine‘s noteworthy ar-
ticle to attack crime victims‘ rights more broadly.  Specifically, apart from 
narrowly construing the federal victims‘ rights statute, Levine argues that 
emphasizing crime victims‘ rights is contrary to both historical practices 
and contemporary understandings of good public policy.88  Both critiques 
merit response because they misunderstand the important underpinnings for 
crime victims‘ rights. 
A. Crime Victims’ Rights Are Consistent with the Original Understanding 
of Justice 
Historically speaking, crime victims have long played an important 
role in the criminal process.  Levine‘s argument to the contrary begins by 
dismissing this country‘s practice of private prosecutions—that is, prosecu-
tions brought by crime victims.89  Levine relies heavily on Blackstone‘s in-
fluential Commentaries on English Law as support for the proposition that 
the colonists understood crimes to be solely public wrongs.90  However, the 
victim-orientation of private prosecutions cannot be so quickly dismissed.  
Indeed, as Levine recognizes, Blackstone himself explained that ―[i]n all 
cases . . . crime includes an injury‖ because ―every public offense is also a 
private wrong, and [thus] . . . it affects the individual, 
and . . . likewise . . . the community.‖91  Given this understanding, it is not 
surprising that early American criminal prosecutions were, as in England,92 






  150 CONG. REC. S10912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
88
  See Levine, supra note 2, at 339 (discussing Blackstone and other historical materials); id. at 
352–60 (discussing contemporary cases involving victims‘ rights). 
89
  See id. at 338 (―With the shift from a private to public system of prosecution came a related shift 
in focus of the system; the interests of the victim were subsumed by the interests of society.‖). 
90
  See Levine, supra note 2, at 337–39 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5). 
91
  BLACKSTONE, supra note 90, at *5. 
92
  See 1 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 249 (Le-
nox Hill Pub. 1973) (1883).  Private prosecution continues to be available in England today.  See Private 
Prosecutions, CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/private_prosecutions/index.html (providing information about in-
itiating private prosecutions) (link). 
93
  See, e.g., William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Re-
turn of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 651–53 (1976). 
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Levine acknowledges these facts, but still believes that the Constitution 
essentially transferred prosecuting discretion to the executive branch.94  To 
our mind, this view pays insufficient attention to the fact that histories of 
the eighteenth century criminal justice system in the United States—
including the period before, during, and after the framing of the Constitu-
tion—reveal that victims often directly prosecuted criminal cases.95  Profes-
sor William McDonald has summarized the period: ―Even after 
identification and arrest, the victim carried the burden of prosecu-
tion . . . [by] retain[ing] an attorney and pa[ying] to have the indictment 
written and the offender prosecuted.‖96  Indeed, early Americans preferred a 
system of private prosecution because it avoided the tyranny of government 
prosecutors and the expense of public-funded prosecutions.97  Thus, legal 
scholars report that private prosecutions were the dominant form of prose-
cution during the colonial period.98 
Levine appears to believe that the practice of private prosecution came 
to an end with the ratification of the Constitution and its creation of a strong 
Executive branch of the federal government tasked with prosecuting 
crimes.99  Yet at the state level, private prosecution extended well into the 
nineteenth century.100  For example, the most thorough study of private 
prosecution in the United States—Professor Steinberg‘s historical review of 
nineteenth century prosecution in Philadelphia—reveals that direct victim 
prosecution of some types of crimes continued until at least 1875.101  Specif-
ically, Steinberg concluded that victims routinely prosecuted cases them-
selves during the early- to mid-1800s: 
 
The discretion of the private parties in criminal cases was 
not checked by the public prosecutor.  Instead, the public 
prosecutor in most cases adopted a stance of passive neu-
trality.  He was essentially a clerk, organizing the court ca-
lendar and presenting cases to grand and petit juries.  Most 





  See Levine, supra note 2, at 339. 
95
  See McDonald, supra note 93, at 651–56 (indicating that victims played prominent roles in pros-
ecutions from Colonial times through the mid-1800s). 
96
  Id. at 652. 
97
  Id. at 653. 
98
  For a summary of some of these studies, see Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea 
Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 568, 571–72 (1984). 
99
  See Levine, supra note 2, at 339–40. 
100
  See, e.g., ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 
1800-1880, at 92 (1989) (link). 
101
  Id. at 224–25 (pinpointing the 1875 election of police magistrates as a turning point which sepa-
rates the early era of private prosecution from the current era of public prosecution). 
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or simply let the private prosecutor and his witnesses take 
the stand and state their case.102 
 
In support of this conclusion, Steinberg cites numerous examples of 
private prosecutors handling cases in the daily Philadelphia criminal dock-
et.103  Thus, in Philadelphia—the only city for which a comprehensive nine-
teenth century history of criminal justice has been compiled—private 
prosecution continued for decades after the American Revolution.104 
Steinberg‘s detailed historical account of the routine functioning of the 
criminal justice system in a major American city is important because it 
discredits Levine‘s suggestion that public prosecutors functionally replaced 
private prosecutors shortly after the American Revolution.105  This historical 
error can be attributed to the fact that Levine takes statutory creation of the 
office of public prosecutor as proof of the end of private prosecution.106  
However, as recognized elsewhere, such conclusions ―naturally over-
emphasize[] the importance of the public prosecutor, since a private prose-
cution system inherited from English common law would not appear in leg-
islation.‖107 
While private prosecutions were important, the office of the public 
prosecutor also developed in the early nineteenth century.108  As Levine cor-
rectly recognizes, the rise of the public prosecutor can be traced largely to 
the problem of private prosecutors abandoning cases.109  However, the rise 
of public prosecutors hardly means that private prosecutions disappeared.  
For example, historian Robert Ireland suggests that ―[b]y 1820, most states 
had established local public prosecutors,‖ but that ―because of deficiencies 
in the office of public prosecutor, privately funded prosecutors constituted a 
significant element of the state criminal justice system throughout the nine-
teenth century.‖110 
One reason why these private prosecutions endured for so long was be-
cause citizens did not trust government lawyers‘ abilities and were con-





  Id. at 82. 
103
  See, e.g., id. at 49–51; see also id. at 63–69 (describing private prosecutions more generally); id. 
at 72–73 (describing private prosecutions of property cases). 
104
  See id. at 25, 224–32 (recounting evidence of the shift in the mid-1800s from private to public 
prosecution). 
105
  See Levine, supra note 2, at 337–38. 
106
  See id. 
107
  See Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson 
and the Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069, 1072 n.14 (1990). 
108
  See Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecution of Crime in the Nineteenth-Century United 
States, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 43, 43 (1995). 
109
  Levine, supra note 2, at 338. 
110
  Ireland, supra note 108, at 43. 
111
  See id. at 44–46. 
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Another reason was the need for victims and their families to secure legal 
representation commensurate with that of defendants.112  For example, Irel-
and noted that ―[t]he presence of able defense attorneys whose collective 
talent clearly surpassed that of the public prosecutor often deepened the di-
lemma of victims of crime or their survivors who desired legal retribu-
tion.‖113  Specifically, ―[t]his imbalance almost compelled those who sought 
criminal convictions to hire private attorneys to help prosecute if the prose-
cution was to have any chance to secure a conviction.‖114  Because of this 
dynamic, privately funded attorneys were most commonly sought in murder 
cases and cases involving sexual assault.115 
Although private prosecution was firmly entrenched in the history of 
the colonies and the states, it does not appear to have been extensively used 
in the federal system.  Thus, it is not surprising that Levine focused her his-
torical review on the federal system.116  The federal system has always been 
a small part of the American criminal justice apparatus, handling the small 
percentage of crimes in which there is a unique federal interest.  Moreover, 
it is readily understandable why private prosecutions played a smaller role 
in these specialized federal cases.  The early federal criminal code estab-
lished crimes against the federal government, and public officials accor-
dingly prosecuted these public crimes.117  From the very inception of the 
federal system starting with the Judiciary Act of 1789, public prosecutors—
including the Attorney General and U.S. Attorneys—were available to 
prosecute federal cases.118  Nonetheless, private citizens still had some li-
mited involvement in federal criminal prosecutions.119  For instance, private 
citizens could initiate prosecutions by obtaining bench warrants from magi-
strates to arrest defendants and by presenting evidence of crimes directly to 
grand juries.120  Additionally, private citizens could pursue a private qui tam 
action for some offenses,121 a vestige of private prosecution that remains vi-





  See id. at 45–46. 
113
  Id. at 45. 
114
  Id. at 45–46. 
115
  Id. at 46 & n.7. 
116
  See Levine, supra note 2, at 339–40 (discussing the federal criminal justice system and constitu-
tional provisions regulating the federal system). 
117
  Dangel, supra note 107, at 1083; accord Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law 
Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 293–96 (1989) (indicating that the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 vested district attorneys with full authority over whether to prosecute federal 
crimes in their districts) (link).   
118
  See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. 
REV. 49 (1924).   
119
  See Dangel, supra note 107, at 1083. 
120
  Id.  
121
  Id. 
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In sum, to the extent that Levine is trying to make a historical argu-
ment against victims‘ rights, the argument simply fails.  Historically speak-
ing, at the time of the ratification of the Constitution, crime victims not only 
had rights in the criminal process, but victims could also use the public 
prosecution process to file and pursue their own criminal charges. 
B. The Importance of Modern Victims’ Rights 
Of course, history does not end debates about contemporary issues of 
public policy.  Even though most crime victims could traditionally pursue 
their own criminal charges, the issue remains whether crime victims should 
have rights in the criminal process in the twenty-first century.  Levine sug-
gests that crime victims should not have such rights because these rights 
will allow victims to meddle with a system of conscientious prosecutors and 
wise judges that properly resolve criminal cases today.122  Levine‘s position 
is susceptible to the rejoinder that not all prosecutors are conscientious and 
not all judges are wise.  But for purposes of this brief Response, we will 
simply assume that prosecutors and judges are all trying to do the right 
thing and that they are generally capable people.  Even on these premises, 
however, a compelling case for crime victims‘ rights remains.  Properly un-
derstood, crime victims‘ rights are not barriers to an effectively functioning 
criminal justice system, but rather an important part of such a system. 
Crime victims‘ rights form part of the checks and balances that ensure 
a properly functioning criminal justice process.  Consider the example of 
plea bargaining.  To our minds, the BP case discussed above is an example 
of a flawed plea bargain.123  The BP case shows that having crime victims 
scrutinize plea deals and present any objections to a judge for review can 
potentially improve the plea bargaining process.  Against a backdrop of ef-
fective crime victims‘ rights, prosecutors (and defense attorneys) know that 
whatever arrangement they come up with cannot simply pass through the 
system without notice.  Instead, crime victims can highlight any defects for 
a judge, who will make the ultimate determination of whether to sign off on 
a plea deal.  This can serve to ensure that plea bargains truly serve the pub-
lic interest, which is the general standard against which plea bargains are 





  See, e.g., Levine, supra note 2, at 361 (―Victims deserve to be treated respectfully and integrated 
into the criminal process; however, forcing prosecutors and judges to elevate victims over the defendant 
and the public may threaten the fair and just adjudication of a criminal case.‖).  See generally id. at 352–
53 (discussing prosecutors‘ duty to pursue cases in the public interest); id. at 356 (discussing judges‘ 
obligation to impose a proper sentence based on many factors). 
123
  See supra text accompanying notes 67–78. 
124
  See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (link); United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1462 (10th Cir. 
1985) (―Rule 11 . . . contemplates the rejection of a negotiated plea when the district court believes that 
bargain is too lenient, or otherwise not in the public interest.‖ (quoting United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 
562, 563 (9th Cir.1983))) (link). 
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In addition to any structural safeguard that crime victims‘ rights 
present, it is perhaps even more important that they extend to crime victims 
the opportunity to participate in the criminal justice system.  Absent from 
Levine‘s vision of the criminal justice system is any recognition of the im-
portance for crime victims to have a role at important junctures in the 
process, like sentencing.  Giving victims a chance to participate in the rite 
of allocution at sentencing can have important benefits for the victim.  As 
one federal district court judge put it in discussing victim impact state-
ments, ―[E]ven if a victim has nothing to say that would directly alter the 
court‘s sentence, a chance to speak still serves important purpos-
es. . . . ‗[Victim] allocution is both a rite and a right.‘‖125  Professor Mary 
Giannini observes that, by delivering a victim impact statement in court,  
 
the victim gains access to a forum that directly and indivi-
dually acknowledges her victimhood.  ‗The moment of sen-
tencing is among the most public, formalized, and 
ritualistic parts of a criminal case.  By giving victims a 
clear and uninterrupted voice at this moment on par with 
that of defendants and prosecutors, a right to allocute sig-
nals both society‘s recognition of victims‘ suffering and 
their importance to the criminal process.‘126 
 
There may be therapeutic aspects to a victim giving a victim impact 
statement.  As one victim explained the process, ―The victim impact state-
ment allowed me to construct what had happened in my mind.  I could read 
my thoughts . . . .  It helped me to know that I could deal with this terrible 
thing.‖127  Another victim said, ―[W]hen I read [the victim impact state-
ment] [in court], it healed a part of me—to speak to [the defendant] and tell 
him how much he hurt me.‖128  Still another victim reported, ―I believe that 
I was helped by the victim impact statement.  I got to tell my step-father 





  United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1349 (D. Utah. 2005) (quoting United States 
v. De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994)) (link). 
126
  Mary Margaret Giannini, Equal Rights for Equal Rites?: Victim Allocution, Defendant Allocu-
tion, and the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 26 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 431, 452 (2008) (quoting Richard A. 
Bierschbach, Allocution and the Purposes of Victim Participation Under the CVRA, 19 FED. SENT‘G 
REP. 44, 46 (2006)). 
127
  NAT‘L VICTIMS‘ CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT NETWORK, VICTIMS‘ RIGHTS EDUCATION 
PROJECT TALKING POINTS KIT 31 (2004) (quoting A Crime Victim, Impact Statements: A Victim’s Right 
to Speak, a Nation’s Responsibility to Listen (1994)), 
www.nvcap.org/vrep/NVCANVREPTalkingPoints.pdf (link). 
128
  Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and the Effects of Utah’s Victims’ 
Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1395 n.107. 
129
  Id. 
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knowledges what the victim has said in the statement, the judge‘s words can 
be (as one victim put it) ―balm for her soul.‖130 
These healing effects are not unusual.  One thorough assessment of the 
literature on victim participation explained, ―The cumulative knowledge 
acquired from research in various jurisdictions, in countries with different 
legal systems, suggests that victims often benefit from participation and in-
put.  With proper safeguards, the overall experience of providing input can 
be positive and empowering.‖131  Thus, the consensus appears to be that vic-
tim impact statements allow the victim ―to regain a sense of dignity and re-
spect rather than feeling powerless and ashamed.‖132 
It is precisely because of these benefits to victims that Congress passed 
the CVRA.  Congress was worried that ―[t]oo often victims of crime expe-
rience a secondary victimization at the hands of the criminal justice sys-
tem.‖133  Congress properly understood that victims will be harmed if they 
are left entirely outside the process.  Nothing in the arguments advanced by 
Levine and other critics of the CVRA undermines that fundamental insight. 
CONCLUSION 
The Crime Victims‘ Rights Act will surely not be the last piece of leg-
islation extending rights to crime victims.  Across the country at both the 
federal and state levels, there is growing recognition that crime victims have 
an important role to play in criminal proceedings.  And that role is one that 
must be protected by both trial and appellate courts.  Those who argue for 
keeping victims outside the process are defending a view of criminal 
processes that is neither historically justified nor good public policy.  Crime 
victims now have protected rights in both federal and state criminal pro-
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